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Conventions, the Great Transformation 
and Actor Network Theory 
Bert De Munck ∗ 
Abstract: »Konventionen, die große Transformation und Actor Network Theo-
ry«. This article proceeds from the field of tension between the synchronical 
approach of the economics of convention and the diachronical approach of 
economic anthropology (in the tradition of Karl Polanyi). It is argued that the 
economics of convention remain problematic to historians in that they fail to 
capture the long term transformations traditionally referred to as the emer-
gence of modernity and the coming about of homo economicus. As a possible 
solution, the use of concepts and insights from Actor Network Theory is pro-
posed. While this cluster of theories enables an historical perspective without 
considering modernity as a natural process, it confronts changing relationships 
between subjects, objects and cultural systems of meaning head on. 
Keywords: conventions, Actor Network Theory, performativity. 
 
Perhaps the most pertinent intervention at the workshop ‘Conventions and 
institutions from a historical perspective’ (Humboldt University Berlin, 10 
February 2012)1 pointed at the possible Eurocentric character of the convention 
approach. Convention-theorists rightfully argue that the price-mechanism is 
embedded in place and time-bound conventions and institutions which inform 
and format the preferences and choices of producers and consumers alike. As 
such, they have de-masked the universal utility-maximizing economic actor as 
an abstraction and an idealization, a notion that exists in (Western) economics 
but not in the economy. However, to the extent that the convention-approach 
continues to proceed from a type of methodological individualism, there may 
still be a universal ‘homo economicus’ involved. This is least what comes to 
the fore when addressing the economics of convention from an anthropological 
and historical angle. As a possible solution I will in this essay suggest to con-
front the economics of convention with certain aspects of Actor Network Theo-
ry – in particular the ideas of Michel Callon. 
                                                             
∗  Bert De Munck, Centre for Urban History, University of Antwerp, Prinsstraat 13, Room D 
325, 2000 Antwerp, Belgium; bert.demunck@ua.ac.be. 
1  See also the introduction from Diaz-Bone and Salais in this HSR Focus. 
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1.  Conventions versus the Anthropological and Historical 
 Approach 
Convention-theories are all about economic actors who actively seek to over-
come uncertainty and arrive at coordinated actions by the purposeful use of 
specific repertoires of evaluation and frames of reference.2 Although this can in 
theory be an unconscious process in which conventions precede the choices 
made by individuals not unlike the way ‘structures’ and ‘discourses’ did in 
orthodox sociology, the balance mostly tips in favor of a more willful econom-
ic actor. I realize, of course, that the ultimate aim of the economics of conven-
tion is to surpass the dichotomy of willful actors (and rational choice theory) 
versus will-less actors (whose choices result from structures, positions and 
discourses),3 but this has – in my opinion – been too difficult a task to date. 
While the heterodox approach has resulted in a richer and more profound un-
derstanding of the heterogeneity of markets and the range of possible conven-
tions involved, the economic actor switching between conventions and contexts 
has hardly been problematized.  
This is why I referred to the founding theories of Boltanski and Thévenot 
(1987, 1991) in my article in the special issue on conventions and institutions 
in Historical Social Research; 36 (2011) 4. In their agenda-setting study pro-
cesses of evaluation and conflicts related to the assessment and ranking of 
persons and things involve both ‘objets’ and ‘dispositifs’, i.e., objects and 
cultural systems of meaning reproduced in the individual. The relationship of 
objects and systems of meaning with subjects differs across ‘mondes’ or ‘cités’. 
While, for instance, objects and dispositions are not detached from the person 
in the so-called ‘monde inspiré’ (they are intimately connected to the mind and 
the body), the ‘monde industriel’ is governed by such material devices as in-
struments, plans, schemes, and the like. And while the important ‘objets’ in the 
‘monde civique’ are laws, decrees, and courts, the ‘monde domestique’ is 
formed by good manners, savoir-vivre, and representation. Unfortunately, the 
very relationship between economic actors, systems of meaning and objects has 
hardly been problematized in subsequent research. For an historian, this is 
problematic, as most long term transformations we are familiar with – the 
emergence of industrial capitalism, processes of proletarianization and aliena-
tion, disenchantment of the world, etcetera – involve changing relationships 
                                                             
2  For references see the special issue on ‘Conventions and institutions from a historical per-
spective’ of Historical Social Research; 36 (2011) 4, edited by Rainer Diaz-Bone and Robert 
Salais. 
3  As was made clear in one of the very first introductions: Jean-Pierre Dupuy, François Ey-
mard-Duvernay, Olivier Favereau, André Orléan, Robert Salais, and Laurent Thévenot. Intro-
duction to Revue Économique vol. 40 (2/1989), special issue on ‘L’économie des conven-
tions’. 
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between subjects and objects and between subjects and discourses or language. 
Recently, the work of Philippe Minard and Alessandro Stanziani among others 
has clearly shown that the coming about of nineteenth-century capitalism was 
not simply a matter of deregulation and the natural maturing of laissez-faire, 
but rather a complex redefining and reshaping of conventions (Minard 2011; 
Stanziani 2003, 2005). Yet a systematic account of long term transformations 
in the relationship between (economic) actors, objects and systems of meaning 
has not been written to date.  
In what sense the shift from a regulated quality to a deliberated quality as 
identified by Minard in the special issue mentioned above differs from a shift 
from a corporatist economy to a free market economy? Should the so-called 
‘monde marchand’ identified by Boltanski and Thévenot be seen as simply 
another type of convention or rather a more general historical shift related to 
the emergence of capitalism? According to Boltanski and Thévenot the ‘monde 
marchand’ is governed by competition and the price mechanism, the latter 
expressing the balance between production capacity and the desires of custom-
ers. While this clearly refers to nineteenth-century orthodox economic thinking, 
it is not clearly spelled out to what extent a ‘monde marchand’ involves a long 
term transformation in the relationship between subjects, objects and language. 
After all, even in the nineteenth century, other conventions – including domes-
tic, civic, industrial etc. – apply as well. But do they differ from their early 
modern counterparts? Following Boltanski and Thévenot the emergence of 
Western capitalism may be reducible to the gradual domination of one conven-
tion. Yet wasn’t there a ‘great transformation’ in Western history which gradu-
ally changed economic practices and processes of subjectivation across differ-
ent sectors and regions (i.e., ‘cités’ or ‘mondes’)?4 
From an anthropological angle, Webb Keane among others has convincingly 
linked economic and colonial dominance to broader and more fundamental 
cultural differences. Among other things, he has argued that Western (Dutch) 
subjects had a totally different relationship with language and discourses than 
their Indonesian ‘subalterns’ in the colonial encounter in the nineteenth and 
twentieth century. The point here is not that subjects use language differently, 
but rather that different types of subjectivation are at stake. While nineteenth 
and twentieth-century missionaries used language to sincerely express their 
alleged intimate self, ‘primitive people’ to them appeared to be fetishistically 
subjugated to language in rituals and ceremonies (Keane 2007). Such research 
is to be situated in a strand of economic anthropology which focuses on 
(changing) subject-object-relationships. Anthropologists studying material cul-
ture have for instance revealed important differences in the way subjects relate 
to objects. Notoriously, objects can be treated as either gifts or commodities. 
                                                             
4  I am of course referring here to the groundbreaking study of Karl Polanyi, first published in 
1944. 
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While in the former case, the spirit of the giver is present in the gift even while 
it is circulating, the latter case corresponds to a situation in which subjects are 
either independent (the liberal version) or alienated (the Marxist version).5  
Addressing convention theories from this angle, the actor invoked in the 
economics of convention would – on the whole – seem to be too constant and 
stable. While her/his preferences and repertoires of evaluation are shown to 
have been variable, her/his degree of autonomy and relationship to discourses 
and objects have mostly been taken for granted. It is as if an economic actor 
can simply shift from one context to the other, chose other instruments (con-
ventions), and make other choices, while his capacity to do so continues to be 
universal.  
2.  From Economics of Convention to Actor Network 
 Theory 
In theory, historians should be able to adequately address this issue. Through-
out the twentieth century they have extensively contributed to several master 
narratives about either an emergent individualism or proletarianisation and 
alienation. On the one hand, the birth of the modern reflexive, emancipated, 
and rational individual has been connected to the Renaissance, the scientific 
revolution and the Enlightenment respectively.6 On the other hand, critical 
historians have written the history of alienation and subjugation from the per-
spective of either proletarianisation and the emergence of capitalist labour 
relations or civilization and disciplining processes in the sense of Norbert Elias 
and Michel Foucault.7 In sociological terms, this could be seen as the emer-
gence of either the economists’ rational actor or the will-less Bourdieusian or 
Foucaultian subject. The last few decades, however, both master narratives 
have to a large extent been qualified. While individualism and rationalism have 
been de-masked as a Western myth built by social scientists and historians 
alike, the history of alienation, civilization and disciplining is now written in a 
more splintered and fragmentary way.8  
The question of how to proceed next is rather urgent for current-day histori-
ans. Economic historians in particular still tend to refer to a more or less stable 
                                                             
5  An interesting introduction to economic anthropology from the perspective of ‘value’ is 
Graeber (2001). 
6  A critical account in Bhambra (2007).  
7  One excellent example in which an economic (Marxist) approach is successfully combined 
with a cultural one is Biernacki (1995). 
8  It is of course impossible to refer to all relevant studies here. By way of introduction to the 
historians’ attempts to reconcile structure and (rational) choice, read the brilliant book 
Sewell (2005).  
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economic actor. The reigning paradigm in economic history is derived from 
new institutional economics (NEI) in which institutions – understood in the 
broadest sense, including informal networks, customs, norms and values etcet-
era – help actors to solve economic problems related to contract enforcement 
and information asymmetries.9 In contrast, social and cultural historians still 
tend to focus on structures, discourses and systems of meaning, while down-
playing individual agency. In this context, the conventional approach is a wel-
come reminder of the multiplicity and heterogeneity of markets and an im-
portant tool to examine the intricate relationship of culture and economic 
practices. However, it tends to obscure the overarching questions related to the 
emergence of free market thinking and modernity. Did markets become disem-
bedded (as Karl Polanyi claimed) or did they rather become over-determined, 
i.e. subject to one over-arching cluster of discourses and habituses which de-
termines the values, preferences and choices of all actors involved? 
Given the importance of ‘objects’ and ‘dispositions’ for Boltanski and Thé-
venot it may be worthwhile to return to their ideas from this angle. How to 
understand the changing role of objects and systems of meaning from an histor-
ical perspective? Do different conventions and different situations simply im-
ply (the use of) different objects or can the role of objects (and the connection 
thereof with subjects) as such change as well? How do material objects connect 
to immaterial elements or discursive practices? One way to explore this is 
through the concept ‘investments in forms’, which connects conventions to the 
tools and instruments used to establish equivalences, comparability and ‘objec-
tive’ judgments on the quality and value of labour and products (Thévenot 
1984, 1986). Economic action involves material devices such as measuring 
equipment alongside non-material elements like rules and customs, cognitive 
abilities and representations. Conventions related to the intrinsic value of silver 
or the purity of milk cannot be separated from the instruments and devices with 
which to measure alloys and impurities – nor, for that matter, from the trade 
and certification marks with which the results thereof are communicated to 
customers.10 However, the relationship between material and non-material 
elements remains underexplored to date. Therefore, I would suggest to link this 
to Actor Network Theory, which specifically focuses on the relationship be-
tween the human and the non-human.  
While economic practices cannot be reduced to processes in which a type of 
homo economicus instrumentally uses objects and instruments to resolve prob-
lems of uncertainty and coordination, the relationship between material devices 
and immaterial systems of meaning is highly unclear. A closer coopera-
tion/confrontation between the economics of convention and Actor Network 
Theory may be an important step towards a more refined approach. One specif-
                                                             
9  One often-cited book is Greif (2006). See for a critical perspective Ogilvie (2011). 
10  Examples in Stanziani (2003, 2005) and De Munck (2012). 
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ic application of this theory involves the notion of performativity, which is 
used by Michel Callon and others to refer to the role of economic theories and 
the related ‘market devices’ in the creation of economic practices (Callon 1998, 
2007). The idea here is that economics and the theories, formulas and instru-
ments economists create not only reflect or represent economic practices but 
also produce certain effects in the economic realm. Perhaps the most famous 
example is the so-called Black & Scholes model (or Black-Scholes-Merton 
model). Basically a mathematical tool which gives the price of options, the 
introduction thereof on the trade floor in the 1970s had at least three types of 
effects. While it influenced the price of options (for a while they tended to 
converge to the model’s theoretical price), it led to a boom in options trading – 
not least because it enabled to calculate the perfect hedge for a portfolio in 
options and hence created the theoretical possibility to trade in options riskless. 
The latter effect was related to a third one: the model legitimised scientifically 
the trade in options, which turned from speculation and gambling into a 
rational activity (MacKenzie 2003, 2004, 2007). 
3.  Economics and Modernity 
What is actually described in this theory is the emergence of ‘calculability’, 
which is situated neither solely in the human mind (cognition) nor simply in 
some external measuring and calculating equipment. Not unlike a machine and 
a manual, the human mind and the tools used for measuring and calculation 
cannot be approached separately. Moreover, the theory explicitly connects 
discourses and ideas to material devices used to measure and calculate. As 
such, it perfectly links up with the contribution of Alain Desrosières to the 
abovementioned special issue of Historical Social Research, in which the 
origin of the economics of conventions is linked to the intellectual process of 
seeing statistics and statistical tools not as reflecting reality, but as producing 
and reinforcing certain effects in reality. As a consequence, statistics could 
often be seen as tools of government in the spirit of Michel Foucault in his 
colleges on ‘governmentality’.11 However, convention theory refrains from 
thinking this through in the Foucaultian sense. While quantification seems to be 
reduced to one convention among others (Desrosières 2011, 74) the broader 
historical transformation in which taxonomies, statistics and quantification 
become dominant tools and ways of thinking, tends to be ignored.  
                                                             
11  For Foucault’s published lectures at the collège de France, see Michel Foucault, Résumés de 
cours, Collége de France (Paris: Julliard, 1989). An English translation of the crucial lectures: 
Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population. Lectures at the Collège de France (1978-
1979) (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007); Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics Lec-
tures at the College de France (1978-1979) (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
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Yet, in history there are strong indications that European capitalism and 
Western dominance as such cannot be understood without these tools and their 
related modes of thinking. Both the Western liberal subject and modern eco-
nomic practices are literally unthinkable without a range of material devices 
such as maps, plans, schemes, forms, diagrams etc. and their related ideas and 
formulas. As an urban historian, I am familiar with the theories of among oth-
ers Patrick Joyce (2003) and Chris Otter (2008), who have argued that the 
Western liberal and self-reflexive subject is quite literally produced through the 
implementation of urban planning and new technologies. Patrick Joyce has 
argued that urban authorities did not rule and discipline in a narrow sense, but 
rather transformed the material form of the city such that free and self-watching 
individuals were produced. For instance, the arrival of running water in the 
home and the capacity to defecate in private is considered to have generated the 
moral self-regulating self and the hygenization of the city simultaneously. In 
the same vein, Chris Otter argues that the introduction of such material devices 
as plate glass and light switches in the nineteenth century transformed social 
monitoring and the self-perception and self-regulation of individuals and 
groups. Examples include the mutual monitoring of groups within libraries, 
museums, reading rooms and art galleries, as well as the encouragement of 
self-inspection and introspection in private and enclosed spaces equipped with 
lamps and mirrors.  
For social and economic historians, the challenge then is to link these politi-
cal and intellectual transformations to economic practices in a more historical 
fashion than did Boltanski and Thévenot. One excellent example is the book 
The rule of experts, in which Timothy Mitchell tries to move beyond the oppo-
sition between, on the one hand, a view on modernity and global capitalism as 
the result of the historical unfolding of an inner-secular logic and, on the other 
hand, a social constructivist approach, in which the ingredients of modernity 
and global capitalism – i.e., the nation, the modern consumer etcetera – are but 
inventions of discourses and/or the social sciences involved. For Mitchell, the 
emergence of the economy in its modern shape and meaning is not solely the 
result of language and social imagination. It rather emerged out of a series of 
‘extra-economic’ events and professional fields including political crises, eco-
logical disasters and statistics. While the economy can be seen as being put in 
place by a ‘new politics of calculation’ (and hence of statistics, measuring 
devices etc.) its birth involves a set of demarcations, new forms of mapping 
and the realignment of colonial power.  
What actually happens in the long run is the gradual reification of both ob-
jects (commodities) and subjects (actors). Western capitalism came along with 
realignments at the level of the division of the world into subjects and objects, 
culture and nature, and the human and the non-human. In its crudest and most 
orthodox way, this can be explained referring to the distinction between a gift 
economy and a market economy. While the spirit of the giver remains attached 
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to artifacts in the former, objects and subjects become separate entities in the 
latter. In a system of gift exchange, there is always a connection between the 
value of the gift and the ‘quality’ (status) of the giver – up to the extent that 
material artifacts remain, in a way, inalienable: they are kept even while given. 
(Weiner) In a market economy, in contrast, objects become subject to the price 
mechanism, while subjects turn into autonomous, rational, self-interested and 
calculating individuals whose choices and preferences determine offer and 
demand. I realize of course, that this is partly a myth and surely a construction, 
but history has shown that this construction becomes a reality in the end.  
4.  Towards New Concepts (for Historians)? 
While Boltanski and Thévenot’s approach had the advantage of pointing to 
different types of markets, historians need concepts to capture the broader 
transformation of subjects in calculating actors and objects into commodities. 
One set of concepts used by Michel Callon could be helpful here, namely 
‘framing’ and ‘disentanglement’, which refer to processes in which objects are 
detached from their physical and cultural environment (including actors) and 
are made measurable and calculable (Callon 1998). The elements involved in 
these processes range from codes, customs, rules, discourses, and representa-
tions, to signs, marks, packaging, and the physical equipment in markets and 
auction halls. As such, these concepts again refer to material and immaterial 
(intellectual) processes simultaneously and should therefore perhaps be linked 
to the broader notion of agencement (translated as ‘assemblage’ in Actor Net-
work Theory).12 This Deleuzian concept not only refers to the assemblages and 
arrangements of human and non-human elements in networks, it implies that 
human agency and the relationship between objects and subjects and between 
subjects and discourses are ‘emergent’ from the network as well. While no 
priority is given to either humans or objects and artifacts, the network defines 
the nature and agency of both the human and non-human elements enrolled in 
it.  
Instead of conventions, priority is given here to networks, but the difference 
is smaller than it superficially appears. While there have surely been genuine 
attempts to arrive at a better understanding of the difference between and rela-
tionship of conventions and networks, current literature tends to adopt an am-
bivalent stance. In the special issue to which the essays in this dossier refer, at 
least two different attitudes towards the relationship can be detected. Whereas 
the network-model is only one of many conventions in the general introduction 
(Diaz-Bone and Salais 2011, 21) the methodological chapter of Rainer Diaz-
                                                             
12  By way of introduction see of course Latour (2005). Also De Landa (2006, 2010). 
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Bone rather considers conventions as emergent from assemblages of humans, 
things and cognitive concepts – so that networks would seem to precede con-
ventions (Diaz-Bone 2011). Although this is neither the time nor the place to 
decide and argue which approach is superior, I am inclined to favour the se-
cond one.  
From an historical perspective it is essential to de-stabilize, contextualize 
and eventually deconstruct the reified reality of both commodities and the 
trans-historical actor as we still know her/him from economic and sociologic 
literature. Economic actors do not only apply and refer to different conventions 
in different context, their very relationship with objects and systems of mean-
ing changes as well. As a consequence, it is necessary to move beyond metho-
dological individualism and the synchronical plurality of conventions and to 
also consider the possibly changing nature of conventions (i.e., its relationship 
to actors, institutions, and networks) throughout history. To be sure, this is not 
to say that Polanyi was right all along. This process can never be considered a 
one-way emergence of autonomous economic actors who decide about prices 
and value independent from objects and systems of meaning. As Callon has 
shown, there are always processes of re-entanglement and overflowing in-
volved. While processes of disentanglement create new (material) traces (e.g., 
delivery notes, invoices etc.), framing creates new externalities (immeasurable 
realities beyond the frame) – as is for instance apparent from debates about 
pollution as a negative outcome of production processes.  
Above all, however, neither commodities nor calculating actors precede the 
material devices with which they are framed and disentangled. As a conse-
quence, the challenge for both historians and social scientists is to write the 
history of the emergence of calculative agencies and commodities without 
falling into the teleological trap of writing the history of modernity. And this is 
perhaps the ultimate trump card of Actor Network Theory. In his eye-opening 
essay Nous n’avons jamais été modernes Bruno Latour considers modernity as 
the artificial distinction between culture and nature or the human and the non-
human, while in reality ‘hybrids’ proliferate. As such, modernity is indeed a 
myth, built by scientists and intellectuals, but at the same time it is a reality and 
produces real effects – among others in the economy. Moreover, following 
Actor Network Theory scholars can no longer start from an independent or 
individual actor, but they should rather examine how they become (perceived 
as) independent and autonomous. Hence my plea for a more thorough confron-
tation of the economics of convention and Actor Network Theory. In contrast 
to convention theories, Actor Network Theory has the potential to account for 
historical transformations on the level of subject-object-formations and explore 
changing arrangements of theories, ideas and discourses, material devices, and 
(economic) practices and choices. 
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